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Introduction of Jack B. Weinstein 
Margaret Berger∗
It’s a great honor for me to introduce Judge Jack B. Weinstein, 
the recipient of one of the inaugural Wigmore Lifetime Achievement 
Awards.  It’s also a little daunting to try to compress into a few min-
utes his remarkable career.  Born in Wichita, Kansas, he grew up in 
Brooklyn, performed on Broadway as a child actor, delivered bread 
and other products by truck and horse-drawn carriage before he 
graduated from Brooklyn College, and then served on a submarine in 
World War II before going to Columbia Law School while working on 
the docks.  Shortly after clerking for Judge Fuld on the New York 
Court of Appeals, he was invited to teach at Columbia, where he 
taught Evidence and Civil Procedure.  He also found time to work on 
Brown v. Board of Education, advise the Kennedys, write articles and 
casebooks on Evidence and Procedure, and co-author Weinstein, 
Korn & Miller, a multi-volume treatise on New York civil procedure,. 
When he hired me in 1962 for four weeks to work on the last 
chapter he was writing for Weinstein, Korn & Miller, I don’t think his 
co-authors had as yet completed their first chapters.  In 1963, he took 
a leave of absence from Columbia and became the Nassau County At-
torney.  In 1965, Chief Justice Warren appointed him to an Advisory 
Committee charged with drafting rules of evidence for the federal 
courts.  That project ended up taking quite a few years.  As you un-
doubtedly all know, promulgation of the rules was held up by Con-
gress in part because of Watergate, and the rules were ultimately en-
acted by Congress, rather than through rule-making. 
By then, Jack Weinstein had completed a treatise on the new 
rules, Weinstein’s Evidence, and he was no longer a professor of law at 
Columbia.  On May 1, 1967 he had become a federal district judge 
for the Eastern District of New York.  So by the time the Federal Rules 
of Evidence became effective in January 1975, there was a treatise tell-
ing everybody what to do, and a judge who could make sure they did 
it. 
 ∗ Suzanne J. & Norman Miles Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. 
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Most of you here, I’m sure, are well acquainted with his many 
masterful, illuminating opinions on the law of evidence, including 
novel opinions on using statistical proof, thoughtful interpretations 
of the hearsay rule, and his exploration of the probabilities associated 
with different standards of proof in Fatico, a case that includes a sur-
vey of the district judges of the Eastern District of New York on this 
question.  Parenthetically, I would add that the judge once told me 
that reading attorney fee applications in the Agent Orange case was 
worse than grading exams.  That is the only standard of proof that I 
have ever clearly understood, and one that may perhaps cheer you up 
at this time of the year. 
The law of evidence was certainly at the heart of his teaching in 
the years he was an academic.  When he spoke at an AALS workshop 
on teaching evidence in 1981 he remarked that he had put a yellow 
slip at each page of Wigmore where there was “something that I did 
not understand and needed to reread” so that by the time he left Co-
lumbia “it looked as if my Wigmore had grown a yellow mold” be-
cause “there was a yellow slip in almost every page.”  So it is certainly 
most appropriate that he is receiving the Wigmore award today. 
But although this is the Evidence Section and this is an Evidence 
award, it would be unacceptably provincial to ignore everything else 
Judge Weinstein has accomplished in his more than forty years on the 
federal bench.  The list is extraordinary; it’s tempting to fill up my al-
lotted time by just naming the numerous innovations he has insti-
tuted in both substantive and procedural law. 
But instead, I’d like to focus on three central and interacting 
characteristics of the judge: his curiosity, his creativity and his com-
passion.  Those of you who know the judge are well aware that he is 
curious about everything.  He is ever ready to learn something new.  
He is not only interested in the most abstruse theoretical questions, 
but is also equally concerned about pragmatic consequences rooted 
in reality.  The result is a willingness to forge new solutions, whether 
this means reopening bankruptcy proceedings in the Manville case to 
provide more money for asbestos victims, or integrating a school in 
Brooklyn, or thinking about alternative dispute resolution, or propos-
ing new causes of action and procedures in toxic tort cases and ex-
tending them to tobacco and firearms, or chafing at the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  Indeed, at times the only curb on his creativity has been 
the Second Circuit, which on more than one occasion has disagreed 
with his innovations.  Most remarkable, however, is that in exercising 
this intellectual prowess he has never forgotten that real people are 
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involved in the cases before him, and that doing justice requires al-
ways keeping these real people in mind. 
Rather than trying to say something intellectually challenging 
during lunch about his remarkable judicial career to a group pre-
eminently qualified to read his opinions and the myriad law review 
articles that analyze and critique Judge Weinstein’s jurisprudence, I’d 
like instead to discuss  briefly two cases. 
I was his law clerk on May 1, 1967 when he started in the Eastern 
District.  In those days there was no integrated calendar system.  In-
stead, judges were assigned different tasks, including handling the 
motion calendar, and that’s where Jack Weinstein began.  One of the 
cases on the motion calendar concerned two plaintiffs who had 
bought two small houses in Nassau County in 1958 via an unrecorded 
conditional sales contract, with title to remain with the vendors until 
the final payment.  While the plaintiffs regularly made their monthly 
payments, lived in the houses and made substantial improvements to 
them, the contract vendor was encountering substantial financial dif-
ficulties that led to the contract being assigned to a bank and the 
docketing of numerous federal, state, and county tax liens and judg-
ment liens against the vendor.  Plaintiffs brought an action in New 
York state court against the bank and all the judicial lienholders and 
other creditors of the vendor, seeking specific performance of their 
contract.  The United States, because of its tax lien, was able to re-
move the case to federal court.  When the case appeared on Judge 
Weinstein’s motion calendar, its posture was that all the parties had 
joined in asking that the houses be sold and that the various liens be 
prioritized against the proceeds.  I asked the judge what to do.  He 
said give the houses to the plaintiffs.  I said, but that’s not what they 
asked for.  The result was that less than one month after ascending 
the bench, in what must be one of his first published opinions, Judge 
Weinstein wrote that the sale remedy sought by the parties “is entirely 
inappropriate in view of the existing rights of the plaintiffs and it is 
denied.”1  Fair warning of what was to come.  I still remember how 
astonished the plaintiffs’ lawyer was when he discovered that if his cli-
ents paid the few thousand dollars remaining on the conditional sales 
contract they would get clear title to the properties.  I look forward to 
the judge turning his attention to subprime lending. 
The second case I want to mention is a much more recent case, 
United States v. Speed Joyeros,2 decided before the Supreme Court’s de-
 1 Engel v. Tinker Nat’l Bank, 269 F. Supp. 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). 
 2 410 F. Supp. 2d 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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cision in United States v. Booker3 modified the use of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  The defendant and her co-defendants had been charged 
with using jewelry businesses in Panama to launder ten million dol-
lars of drug money.  The defendant pleaded guilty, and the opinion 
discusses whether the judge was correct in accepting her plea and 
granting a substantial downward departure in sentencing.  The judge 
notes that he had not seen any admissible evidence, and that even if 
the defendant was guilty of money laundering this would not neces-
sarily mean that drugs were involved. 
Much of the opinion consists of a troubling look at our criminal 
justice system.  The opinion notes that by 2001, ninety-five percent of 
all federal convictions were being disposed of through guilty pleas, 
and that it is the prosecution, rather than defense counsel, the jury, 
or the judge, that now plays the central role in criminal prosecutions 
because of the threat of much greater punishment if defendant fails 
to plead.  The opinion contains a long discussion on plea bargaining 
and coercion; the various meanings of “voluntary” in the law; a his-
tory of sentencing, bail reform, and constitutional and statutory as-
pects of the speedy trial requirement; and attorney-client conflicts.  
Those of you who teach Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law, Pro-
fessional Responsibility, or Evidence should take a look at this case. 
But what is most remarkable is how this erudite exposition is ap-
plied to the facts.  The defendant was a forty-nine-year-old, recently 
widowed woman who had a six-year-old son who had been conceived 
after years of fertility treatments.  She had been incarcerated for 
more than eighteen months before she pleaded, and Judge Weinstein 
was extremely concerned that the plea may have resulted from exces-
sive coercion.  He notes that her principal desire was to be reunited 
with her son, and that the psychiatrist whom he asked to evaluate her 
thought that she might have been under the false impression that if 
she pleaded she could be sentenced to time served.  The Panamanian 
government delayed turning over documents that the defendant 
needed to prepare a defense until a few months before trial.  Al-
though Judge Weinstein twice granted bail under conditions that he 
believed would guarantee her presence so that she could work on her 
defense, the Court of Appeals stayed the grant on both occasions.  
The opinion contains a discussion with statistics on how denying bail 
creates intense pressure on defendants to plead.  When she started to 
receive the Panamanian documents just a few months before the 
scheduled trial date, there was insufficient room in her cell to ac-
 3 543 U.S. 320 (2005). 
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commodate these materials and the necessary accountants, lawyers, 
and computers needed to assist her.  So Judge Weinstein made avail-
able a room at the courthouse to which she was to be transported 
daily.  However, she had to wait outside for hours in February, await-
ing transport between the jail and the court, and she had inadequate 
warm clothing—so the judge ordered warm clothing and additional 
food, which he also found she was lacking.  The government had for-
feited all of defendant’s assets so that she could not pay counsel; over 
the strong objection of the government, the court ordered enough of 
her funds released to pay her attorneys for work already done.  But 
that did not cover payment for future legal services.  The judge was 
extremely concerned about a possible conflict of interest:  that the 
lack of assets to pay legal fees and costs and the prospect of a lengthy 
trial might have led defense counsel to recommend a plea. 
So if you read this opinion you will get some sense of Jack 
Weinstein as a judge:  a person who throughout his years on the 
bench has been able to juxtapose an unparalleled holistic under-
standing of our system of justice with a vision of justice for the indi-
vidual.  Please join me in wishing him and us that he will serve many 
more years on the bench. 
